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Article: 
Introduction 
In late 1038, the Tai-speaking Sino-Vietnamese frontier chieftain Nùng Tôn Phúc (or Toàn Phúc)(? -1039) 
made his bid to be king.
1
 Tôn Phúc's grab for power was as bloody as it was sudden when in late autumn he 
allegedly murdered both his brother and brother-in-law, and seized their lands. Tôn Phúc gave his newly 
amalgamated realm the hopeful name Kingdom of Longevity and took for himself the exalted title "Luminous 
and Sage Emperor."
2
 He gave his eldest son Ming Ton Thông (? -?) the military title King of the Southern 
Command and his wife A Nung (? -1054) the title Enlightened and Virtuous Empress Dowager.
3
 Tôn Phúc then 
broke off all ties with the Vietnamese ruler Ly Phât Ma ((Thai Tang , r. 1028-1054), who was his principal 
patron and leader of the expanding ai Cô Viêt (968-1054) kingdom. 
 
The suggestion that Tôn Phúc's family could be elevated in status to that of an imperial household brought the 
frontier chieftain into direct conflict with both the Chinese Song and Vietnamese Ly courts, and constituted a 
direct challenge to their rule. However, the Chinese authorities hesitated to take direct action. The Song 
statesman Sima Guang (1019-1086) would comment that when the local prefect at Tianzhou requested 
assistance to deal with Nùng Tôn Phúc's revolt, the officials from circuit seat of Yongzhou (modern-day 
Nanning) appeared afraid to become involved in the situation and declined to offer assistance.
4
 Quite the 
reverse of Chinese indecision, the response of Ly Phât Mã to Tôn Phúc's actions was swift and unwavering. In 
the spring of 1039 the Vietnamese ruler personally led an army into the northern highlands region to capture 
Tôn Phúc, his eldest son and his closest accomplices. The cheiftain's wife and second son Nung Tri Cao (1025-
1055) both managed to escape the manhunt by fleeing to the Song side of the border. However, the hapless 
captives were taken to the capital city of Than Long, modern-day Ha Nôi, where the Vietnamese court soon 
beheaded them all in a public execution. 
 
At first glance, this event appears to be no more than a minor disturbance along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier. 
Moreover, it is difficult to determine the motive behind the brash actions taken by Tôn Phuc and his followers. 
Did he act as a rebellious vassal who had abandoned his responsibilities to his direct superior, the Vietnamese 
ruler? Or did Tôn Phúc draw on political currents that found their origins beyond the court politics of Kaifeng 
or Thng Long? As events are described in the extant court chronicles, one could easily conclude that Tôn Phuc's 
behavior was influenced by the same forces that motivated many would-be founders of Chinese-style dynasties 
in the South, including even the early 10th century Vietnamese rulers. However, a careful examination of these 
same events from an indigenous perspective will reveal a more complex balancing of local and interregional 
concerns, targeting multiple audiences. To understand these differences, one must first examine how political 
relations were conducted under the Chinese imperial tribute system and its corollary frontier variant, the jimi or 
"loose rein" system. 
 
 
 
View of the Frontier from the Chinese and Vietnamese Courts: a Tributary Gateway 
When both the Song and Ly rulers sought to locate and interact with local chieftains inhabiting the peripheries 
of their realms, they did so through a political vocabulary developed by ancient Chinese scholars in their 
discussions of an ideal world order. This world order would be known in Western scholarship as the "tribute 
system," and tribute relations, or gift giving, as a court-centered activity, would eventually serve as a focal point 
around which imperial Chinese and Vietnamese political, economic and cultural exchanges with neighboring 
polities revolved. The pre-modern Chinese tribute system was based on an early Han (roughly 3
rd
 century BCE) 
understanding of legendary ties fostered between the Zhou ruling house and its vassal states during the Spring 
and Autumn Period (771-480 BCE). 
 
According to this ideal version of imperial administration presented in the ancient text Rites of Zhou (Zhou Li), 
the ruler viewed his empire through the setting of the Nine Domains, emanating out from his personal 
residence. To maintain his realm of authority, the ruler awarded fiefs of land to all of his subordinates, 
according to their hierarchical rankings. In return, the ruler expected regular presentations of tribute from all 
quarters. Local resources from each region called native tribute (tugong) dictated the quality and quantity of 
these gifts. Several works in the Confucian canon, specifically Rites of Zhou and Tribute of Yu (Yu Gong), 
described the spatial arrangement of tributary states beyond the Zhou royal house, as well as positioning of 
these states' emissaries in ceremonies involving the Zhou rulers.
5 
 
The successful reign of a Son of Heaven (Tian Zi), as envisioned by the Rites of Zhou authors, required political 
unity under the legitimate leadership of the royal house. This was a ruler whose every action would have a 
direct effect on his subjects. However, only when all peoples had recognized the legitimacy of the Son of 
Heaven would this designated ruler have the power to bring harmony to the forces governing Heaven and Earth. 
Early political treatises such as the Tribute of Yu, the Record of the States (Guo Yu), the Rites of Zhou, and the 
Xunzi, all detailed how the Son of Heaven and his subjects, including non-Chinese subjects beyond the nine 
central provinces, ought to behave in encounters with one another.
6
 
 
This pivotal role of the Chinese emperor was certainly not unique to the early Chinese imperial system. 
Considering early state development worldwide, Henri Claessen and Jarich Oosten have noted that in many 
societies "the central position of the ruler is usually based upon a mythical charter and a genealogy which 
connects him to gods, ancestors, or spirits."
7
 These researchers contend that the legitimacy of these early states 
were often "based upon a notion of reciprocity," by which subjects provided the sovereign with gifts and 
services and the ruler responded with promises of an orderly society and "the bestowal of benevolence."
8
 In the 
Chinese imperial practice, gift giving in increasingly elaborate ceremonies became an integral part of these 
encounters. Although these early descriptions of the tribute giving were highly idealized, the implied 
relationship between an absolute ruler from the Central Plains region of North China and his non-Chinese 
subjects continued to appeal to subsequent generations of Chinese emperors. 
 
The tribute system worked well in managing relations with distant neighbors. However, a related system was 
eventually introduced to organize ties with China's border communities. The Tang dynasty brought the 
establishment of the "loose rein" (jimi) system of frontier prefectures and districts. The jimi system fit into the 
traditional Chinese frontier policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians (yi man zhi man)," although the 
general stability of the southwest frontier during the Tang certainly played a role in implementing such a lenient 
policy. Under this system the Tang court appointed leaders of local ethnic groups to exercise authority at the 
military prefecture (fu), civil prefecture (thou), county (xian), and "mountain grotto" (dong) levels. The official 
rank of these local leaders varied; some were granted the title Area Commander-in-Chief (dudu fu), a military 
designation, while leaders at the zhou and xian levels would often receive irregular hereditary titles such as 
regional chief (cishi), commandery prince (junwang), princedom administrator (zhangshi), and "equestrian 
sentinel" (sima). The Tang court charged these local leaders with the collection of native tribute, the 
organization of corvée labor, and the pacification of banditry. This system collapsed with the fall of the Tang. 
However, the founders of the Song dynasty immediately restored the institutions as a part of their own border 
policy, even granting titles to clans that could provide evidence of their service to Tang rulers.  
This system of employing local chieftains both to maintain regional stability and to supply a steady stream of 
"local products" to the Chinese court was by nature a delicate arrangement. The Chinese rulers encouraged 
strong leadership from their local representatives. However, they were well aware of instances in the past when 
powerful chieftains had chosen to establish independent kingdoms, challenging the Tang court's regional 
control and eluding Chinese sovereign might, as was the case with the founding of the Nanzhao kingdom in 
750. As the Northern Song scholar Fan Zuyu (1014-1098) commented, "Since the founding of the Tang, in 
activities requiring leadership in the south, (Chinese) rulers all have turned to border officials who grab up 
positions with an eye toward personal gain. They begin by gathering together local Man people, and then come 
to our country to pillage and rob. This situation has become a great concern to the country."
9
 The Tang court's 
recourse was to maintain a centralized military force strong enough to quell such frontier disturbances quickly 
and decisively. However, by the late 8th century, in the aftermath of the An Lushan Rebellion, the Chinese 
court was seldom able to muster such a force. 
 
The source of continuing conflict may actually be found in the frontier's own political order. Writing about the 
pre-modern "local commander" (tusi) system of China's northwest border, Owen Lattimore once noted: "The 
new character of authority (of border chiefdoms) seems to be directly related to the function of the chief as 
representative of his tribe, recognized by the Chinese in order to provide institutions and conventions for the 
coexistence of the Chinese community and the tribal communities... In this way the hereditary principle is 
strengthened and a family of chiefs may come to have a vested interest in perpetuating the subordination of the 
people as a whole, in order to sustain its own authority. A status of this kind is quite compatible with occasional 
leadership of tribal insurrections against the dominant people.”
10
 These local hereditary positions were created 
to fit within a framework of Chinese institutional order, but these positions also produced opportunities for 
expanding and exploiting power by the same individuals charged with their administration. 
 
It is likely that few officials, either Song or ai Cô Viêt, were surprised when border tensions erupted in the early 
11th century. The Sino-Viêt frontier had long suffered from poverty and banditry, and the region was known to 
be unstable as the result of mass migrations, natural disasters, or local administrative weakness. During the 
latter Han dynasty (AD 162-178), several rebellions spread throughout the mountain valleys of Guangxi and 
Guizhou, effectively cutting off Giao Chi's administrative center, Thng Ngô, from the southern portion of the 
Han-Viêt territory. The Han court, weakened by internal dissent, was finally forced to send a new governor Jia 
Zong (? -?), who was said to display uncommon sympathy for the local people.
11
 In a poem that circulated years 
after Jia's day, it was written, "Father Jia arrived late, allowing us first to rebel. (However) one sees this region 
at peace, a place where local officials dare not eat (at the expense of the local people)."
12
 Local rebellions 
during the Tang dynasty led to permanent geopolitical and cultural changes. When an ill-prepared Tang army 
failed to pacify a local revolt by the "Yellow Grotto barbarians," other acts of rebellion destabilized the border 
region.
13
 Chinese efforts to regain local control were incomplete, and the regional unrest fed into wider conflicts 
among local chiefs. These tensions eventually played a part in igniting the war with the Nanzhao kingdom in 
854.
14
 Moreover, the conflicts widened the gap between the Han-Viet officials and residents living around the 
Hang River delta and the local chieftains from the mountainous border region, who had rallied behind the anti-
Tang banner. 
 
The Chinese court during the early Song focused on the consolidation of civil authority, building on practices 
successfully implemented at the height of Tang dynastic power. To this end, the Song court followed the 
subjugation of its leading southern rival, the Nan Han court in 971 by recognizing and seeking the loyalty of 
local leaders along the Southwest frontier. Leaders who approached the court with requests for "Interior 
Dependency`'(neifu) status were awarded with a variety of honorific titles from antiquity. The early Song court 
at this time offered specific titles to demonstrably loyal members of the Zhuang border community. Moreover, 
the Song's apparent military superiority inspired loyalty among these local chieftains. As Jeffery Barlow states, 
"The (Song) campaigns against southern Han were so swift and well-managed that they must have seemed, to 
the Zhuang, irresistible."
15 
 
The example of the Tai-speaking frontier chieftain Mo Hongyan (? -?) illustrates how the Song court desired to 
exercise control along its southwestern frontier. During the summer of 974, Mo Hongyan, an "uplands militia 
leader" of the Nandan Aboriginal Prefecture, sought "Interior Dependency" status from the Song court.
16
 
Sources suggest that Mo first proclaimed himself Military Governor of his region, and then sent his lieutenant 
Chen Shaogui (? -?) to establish tribute relations with the Chinese court.
17
 As the first Song emperor Taizu, 
Zhao Kuangyin (928-976) reportedly granted Mo the title Regional Inspector (cishi).
18
 The Mo clan continued 
to receive this title for several generations, maintaining their position of leadership in the region. Leaders of the 
border region saw security and stability in the establishment of tributary ties with the Chinese court, placating a 
powerful potential adversary while securing support for their own local expansion. Meanwhile. Song officials 
measured the depth and breadth of the empire's influence by the number of tributary titles granted and number 
of tribute missions received at court. 
 
In 976, at a time when the recalcitrant Southern Tang (937- 976) armies had just fallen to Song forces, the 
newly enthroned Song Taizong (r. 976-97) announced that the border policy would continue to follow ancient 
precedents.
19
 Mo sent another envoy with tribute and a request for an imperial seal to confirm Mo's 
appointment. The emperor ordered that this seal be carved and given to the tribute mission.
20
 Mo's position was 
thus made hereditary, marking the beginning of the Mo clan's administration of Nandan Prefecture for future 
generations. With court patronage, the Mo clan expanded their territorial reach and economic control as cattle 
herdsmen in their region, and even commanded a local militia of sixty men. While Mo gained stature and power 
through his appointment, he also was beholden to the Song court. Mo's indebtedness was clearly marked by his 
offering of one hundred liang of silver in 980, probably as a part of a group of 734 local leaders from the south-
west brought tribute and prized horses to the Chinese on the eve of an attempted invasion of the ai Cô Viêt 
kingdom. Ample textual evidence provides a clear picture of the Mo clan's rise to local prominence through 
Song court patronage in Guangxi; however, their case was not exceptional. The Nùng clan took a similar path to 
power. 
 
Although the Vietnamese leadership described relations with their neighbors, particularly China, in tributary 
terms, the ai Cô Viêt court's method of controlling the peoples along its northern border initially differed 
considerably from the Chinese model. First of all, the ai Cô Viet ruler maintained personal bonds with his 
border officials, all of whom were allied to the central court through yearly oaths of loyalty.
21
 Secondly, the Ly 
court leadership, after quelling the civil warfare that followed the collapse of the short-lived Former Lê Dynasty 
(980-1009), faced very little domestic unrest. The early Ly emperors could turn their attention to the direct 
control of Giao Chi's southern and northern frontiers.
22
 In the example of Ly Phât Mã, the ruler married his 
daughter the princess B"nh Dng (? -?) to a powerful border official to support good relations. Marriage alliances 
between emperors and foreign rulers were practiced in the past in China as well. However, the Viêt court was 
not firming up ties with neighboring kingdoms. Rather, it was strengthening domestic stability by personalizing 
ties between the central court and its appointed border representatives. While the Chinese court granted titles 
and extended institutions as a way of laying claim to frontier authority, the ai Cô Viêt court at the beginning of 
the Ly dynasty was elaborating on a more personal, more engaged policy of border relations. 
 
Although the Vietnamese leadership often attempt to strengthen frontier relations through peaceful means, 
military excursions into border territory in the period prior to Nùng Tôn Phúc's revolt were also common, As 
Barlow writes, "Typical examples of Vietnamese raids include one ordered by Ly Công Uân (974-1028), the 
founder of the Ly dynasty in 1009, who, in 1017 dispatched his brother-in-law to raid into Yong prefecture. The 
local administrators ordered local militia (tuding) from the mountain grotto settlement to pursue them.
23
" In 
early 1029, Phât Mã had attempted to pacify the border region with an arranged marriage between his daughter 
the princess B"nh Dng and the hereditary head of frontier Lang Châu Prefecture and the Thàn clan, Thàn Thiêu 
Thái (? -?)
24
 Shortly after the marriage alliance was announced, Giáp ãn Nãi (? -?), leader of nearby A" Châu 
prefecture, revolted. Phât Mã personally led the expedition to put down the revolt and capture of its leader. 
When the frontier prefecture of Hoan Châu rebelled in early 1030, and in Nguyên (? -?) and Trê Nguyên (? -?) 
rose up in rebellion in 1033, Phât Mã launched punitive campaigns to suppress these revolts. 
During this same period Ly Phât Mã began to express the nature of his regional authority increasingly often in 
imperial terms. In the spring of 1034, Phât Ma adopted a new reign title thông thuy to acknowledge both his 
military victories the appearance of various auspicious signs around the palace compound. He then issued the 
edict that all officials should present memorials formally before his throne, and that they should convene in a 
hall he designated "the imperial court."
25
 The Viêt ruler further tested his authority at court a year later by 
promoting a favorite concubine to imperial status as Empress Thiên Cam. When dissent over this change in the 
imperial household erupted in the form of yet another rebellion in A" Châu prefecture, Phât Mã swiftly crushed 
his opposition. 
 
By late 1036, however, unrest in the vicinity of the ai Cô Viêt kingdom came to the attention of even Kaifeng 
when violence spilled over the border. In the fall of 1036 inhabitants of Giáp ông , Lng Châu , Tô Mu Quang 
Nguyên an Ba B"nh Nguyên ô Kim, and Thng Tân, all within the Lâm Tây administrative circuit, revolted. The 
insurrection eventually crossed into Song territory at Siling, Xiping and Shixi all sub-prefectures within 
Yongzhou Prefecture. Rebels reportedly robbed both indigenous inhabitants and Chinese settlers of horses and 
cattle, and burned their homes before returning to the Viêt side of the border. Upon hearing of these attacks, the 
Chinese court held the Viêt court responsible for a lack of regional supervision; the Song emperor officially 
admonished Ly Phât Mã, demanding that the perpetrators be attacked and captured.
26
 
 
The Viêt leader did not require much encouragement to reach his direct control into this border region. On 
February 17, 1037, Ly Phât Mã and his son the Phung Kiên prince personally led a military expedition to Lâm 
Tây. Phât Mã had left his other son and heir-apparent Ly Nhât Tôn, the Khai Hoàng prince, in charge of affairs 
at court. The court military quickly subdued the rebel force, and by the third month the troops had returned to 
the capital. The ai Cô Viêt ruler then ordered the imperial garrison at Nghê An prefecture to take control of fifty 
local storehouses, including T Thành, Li Nhân, and V"nh Phong.
27
 In the process of responding to the Song 
edict, the Ly court did not hesitate to extend their direct control of the area's resources. This quest for power 
consolidation would directly influence the development of events in the next large-scale disturbance. Little 
more than a year would pass before Nùng Tôn Phúc would launch his bid for power in the face of the expanding 
Vietnamese authority. 
 
In the wake of Nung Tôn Phuc's rebellion, Ly Phât Ma's harsh response to Tôn Phuc's act of defiance may be 
considered suitable, given his responsibilities as a tributary vassal of the Song court. Tributary protocol required 
that the Vietnamese leader be held accountable for all local disturbances in this Sino-centric world order. 
However, perhaps more importantly in the eyes of his own subjects, Ly Phât Mã chose to interpret Tôn Phúc's 
act as a threat to the harmony of a world order that he alone maintained. Shortly before killing his prisoners, 
Phât Mã expressed to his assembled court his anger, and restated the imperial scope of his own leadership in the 
short Imperial Mandate to Pacify the Nùng: 
 
Once I had come to possess all under Heaven, all of my generals, ministers, and officials led a great celebration. 
From all foreign lands and special regions there was no one who did not attend. Furthermore, according to 
precedent, the Nang clan for generations has protected our frontier, and they have frequently come to court 
bearing tribute. Today Tôn Phúc is displaying a great arrogance by illicitly adopting a reign title and by issuing 
edicts. His followers are gathering like swarms of gadflies, and he has spread poisonous ideas among the border 
people. With Heaven's authority, I will strike out and punish him. I have made five members of that group, Tôn 
Phúc among them, outlaws, and I will have them beheaded at the capital.
28
 
 
This claim of heavenly right to resort to hegemonic action for greater good sounds much like the type of world 
order promoted by Chinese rulers. Since the founding of an independent Viêt state, the Ly rulers were the first 
local leaders to project this vision on their realm. Claiming universal authority and Heaven's sanction for his 
actions placed Ly Phât Ma at the same level of power as a Chinese emperor. To appeal to his own subjects, the 
Viêt ruler was prepared to reach beyond the Song's conferred tributary vassal status to claim imperial omnipo-
tence. 
 
Later Vietnamese histories became more ambiguous on the question of sovereignty, perhaps because the goal of 
these historians in the matter of settling the issue of regional responsibility was to delineate the outermost 
boundary of the Viêt court's effective authority. By the 15th century, the events surrounding Nùng Tôn Phúc's 
rebellion found a place in the larger context of Sino-Viêt relations. In the DVSKIT, the events are set in the 
context of the Viêt emperor's greater responsibility to his realm. The entry for 1039 begins with a description of 
Ly Phât Mã's 2nd month performance of agricultural rites. The DVSKYT notes "Thái Tông (Ly Phât Mã) 
restored the ancient rites by performing the ritual plowing of the imperial fields in person. In this manner, he 
ruled 'All under Heaven' addressing (Heaven) above him by worshipping at the ancestral temple, and addressing 
(Man) below him by leading the myriad common people. Ruling in this manner led to riches and prosperity (for 
the realm). This was beneficial indeed!"
29
 This reference to the practice of this ancient imperial ritual of 
Chinese origin is followed by a reference to the rebellion, dated 12/1039: "In Quang Nguyên, Nùng Tôn Phúc 
rebelled, and the Song granted (the Viêt) emperor the title King of Southern Pacified Region." The next entry 
reads "in that same year the Eastern Expedition King used his power and authority to wipe out (the rebels)."
30
 
By linking the events of the ritual plowing of his own lands and the suppression of banditry at the command of 
the Song court, the DVSKTT account reveals the interesting overlapping of spheres of authority that the Ly 
ruler had established to insure the survival of his kingdom. 
 
The significance of the joining of these two events would not be lost on a contemporary reader. The Viêt 
emperor is first shown performing the universalistic role of linking the realm above (Heaven) to the realm 
below (Man). This is the very same position of authority claimed by the Chinese emperor, and any attempt to 
attribute this responsibility to both Chinese and Viêt ruler anticipates the inherent tension in Sino-Viêt relations. 
However, in a separate but related context, the Viêt ruler is a King of the Southern Pacified Region within the 
Song political sphere, and he performs this duty with "kingly authority (wang li)." The Viêt emperor, in the eyes 
of his people, is the universal ruler whose realm, "all under Heaven," is all that the Chinese notion also 
suggests. However, in contemporary Song political terms, the Viêt ruler is a king among other kings, albeit one 
whose authority, granted by the Chinese court, extends to the pacification of regional conflict. 
 
The Song court, in reacting to Vietnamese success in crushing the uprising, considered events specifically in 
terms of the two courts' tributary relationship. As noted above, in early 1039, Emperor Renzong granted Phât 
Ma the title King of Southern Pacified Region.
31
 The court likely regarded the title granted to Phât Mã as a 
reminder of the Viêt ruler's position within the network of tributary relations and also as a request that the Viet 
leader keep a watchful eye on this weakened region and curtail the activities of any group who might wish to 
stir up trouble. Without a strong military presence along the southern frontier, the early Song court continued to 
turn defense and policing over to its local representative, presumed to be the vassal ruler in Thng Long. 
 
However, one might also argue that the Chinese court's willingness to leave Viêt authorities in charge of the 
border region revealed an imperial lack of concern for this frontier area. During the early Song, disturbances 
along China's northern border, generated by frayed relations with both the Liao and Xi Xia nomadic kingdoms, 
had occupied most of the court's attention. When Nùng Tôn Phúc led his uprising, the Song emperor Renzong 
showed little interest in taking direct action to quell the unrest. Instead, he relied on the historical precedent of 
delegating a frontier representative, in this case the ruler of Giao Chi, to perform such tasks. While threats to 
Song territory along the northern bor der involved militarily formidable foes and had a direct effect on Kaifeng's 
security, disturbances on the southern frontier were contained enough to be handled indirectly though the 
delegation of authority. 
 
This decision was further conditioned by the hierarchical order at the heart of the tributary relationship that the 
Song court had fostered with the Viêt rulers. As a practice underlining the Song court's claim to be the region's 
central authority, Chinese rulers retained the privilege to grant special titles to subordinates for their services. 
The Song's granting of the title King of Southern Pacified Region to Phât Mã signaled support for a defensive 
move against the Nùng clan rebels. The early Song court saw frontier stability as its prerogative, but saw the 
active policing of the Southwest as the responsibility of its tributary neighbor, the ai Cô Viêt kingdom. 
 
The balancing of roles and responsibilities between acting as a tributary king in the Chinese context and ruling 
with imperial authority in the Viêt context is echoed in a Vietnamese account of Ly Phât Mã's capture and 
execution of Nùng Tôn Phúc. Chinese court scholars once argued that, in the process of imposing this order, the 
ai Cô Viêt court's severe treatment of the border communities led to further unrest, and that the local situation 
only worsened.
32
 More likely, it was Ly Phât Mã's initial unwillingness to eliminate the Nùng clan completely, 
hoping that the court could retain their loyalty that contributed to the crisis. In any case, this episode was 
followed by a series of rebellions that left a lasting imprint on Sino-Viet relations for years to come. 
 
Tai Clan Rivalry and Economic Competition 
To understand fully the local balance of power in the southwest border region, we must picture a social order 
that predated the imposition of Chinese imperial institutions. The frontier region inhabited by Tai-speaking 
indigenous peoples in the 11
th
 century extended from Bao Lac Prefecture to V"nh An Prefecture in the northern 
Viêt region and the Qinzhou Prefecture on the South Chinese coast. Although both Viêt and Chinese authorities 
labeled all of the local inhabitants as "barbarians of the South" (man), there were many distinct communities 
throughout this region. The majority of these communities belong to a single Tai-speaking ethnicity, the 
Chinese Zhuang or Vietnamese Nùng ethnic group. 
 
During the 11
th
 century, most of the Sino-Viêt border region was controlled by a small number of surname-
groups. In the easternmost area of the frontier, the Hoàng/Huang surname group was predominant. Although 
this group was relatively small, Viet rulers often assigned its members leadership positions in An V"nh.
33
 By 
the early Song period, the Vi/Wei surname group had settled in the Tô Mâu Prefecture in the northern Viêt 
region and in Siling. Luzhou, and Xiping regions on the Song side of the border. These two groups, along with 
the Nùng/Nong and Chu/Zhou surname groups, were the principal occupants of a region between the Viet and 
Han Chinese settlements. Leaders among these surname groups maintained strong personal, quasi- familial ties, 
through which they maintained their authority. Describing the indigenous border communities of 16th-century 
Guangxi, one historian writes, "while chieftains who shared the same family name did not necessarily share the 
same ancestry... they often invoked the real or imagined ties to form alliances or to assert their influence."
34
 The 
practice of fashioning a network of kinship-like relations, joined by particular surnames, predates even this 
study. This custom accounts for the fact that following the Nang rebellion, the number of local inhabitants bear-
ing the surname Nùng declined considerably, while an increased number of people from the same region used 
the surname Triêu (Zhao), which was the surname of the Song ruling family. 
 
The Nang clan traditionally owed their loyalty to a Sino-Viet elite who had governed An Nam (or northernmost 
Vietnam) during the Tang dynasty. By the early Song dynasty, Nùng leaders were in charge of four 
administrative units (duo) once part of the Tang's "loose rein (jimi)" system; the prefectures of Anping and 
Zhongliang in modern-day China, as well as Vu Lc and Quang Nguyênin Vietnam.
35
 The Bng River region of 
steep mountains and valleys in which the Nùng clan lived was known for its gold and cinnabar, although the 
people lived primarily from agricultural production. Settlements were in villages along the Bng River, in 
connected valleys, and at higher altitudes along mountain slopes. Although the village settlements were 
secluded from one another, interaction with other native groups, and later with Han settlers, was common. 
Moreover, even with the decline of the Tang and the resulting dissolution of direct northern court control in the 
region, the Nang continued to accept the patronage of absent rulers, both from the north and from the Viêt 
region, who claimed nominal control of border region. 
 
Song Taizong also bestowed favor on the Nùng leadership, when this clan succeeded the Hoàng clan as the 
dominant political presence in the Left and Right Rivers Region. Given the strategic location of this region amid 
the mountains bordering on territory claimed by the ai Cô Viêt kingdom, the Chinese emperor was wise to gain 
its leaders' loyalty. The first member of the clan to in official recognition was Nùng Tôn Phùc's father Nùng 
Dân Phu (? -?). In early 977, a memorial from the Yongzhou Garrison reported that the aboriginal chieftain of 
Quang Nguyên Prefecture, the "Peaceful and Generous" leader Nùng Dân Phu had already established himself 
as the leader of a po of ten neighboring villages, after gaining the support of the Southern Han (907-971) 
court.
36
 Authorities in Yongzhou recommended that the Song court ask for Dân Phú's lands by imperial decree, 
and grant the local leader "Interior Dependency" status in return for the payment of tribute and taxes. 
 
The emperor decreed that Dân Phil receive the title of acting Minister of Works and "Grand Master of Splendid 
Happiness Bearing the Golden Pocket with Purple Trimming".
37
 The court then assigned Xu Dao (? -?), 
Transport Commissioner of Guangzhou, the task of traveling to Dân Phú's home region to confer the title. These 
titles were much too grand to hold any specific meaning for this local leader. However, the Chinese court 
wished to make its mark in this far-flung territory. As mentioned earlier, the Song leadership granted nominal 
ranking to local leaders who joined Chinese forces in the ultimately unsuccessful assault on Lê Hoàn's forces in 
980. Granting lofty titles to this local leader may well have been an effort to instill allegiance to the Song throne 
in those persons who actually wielded authority in this distant region. 
 
Dân Phú would eventually pass his honors to his son, and Nùng Tôn Phúc had been granted the additional 
authority to rule Thang Do Prefecture, which was located to the northwest of Quang Nguyên. His 
younger brother Toàn Lôc (? -1039) controlled Van Nhai Prefecture, while his wife A Nùng's younger brother 
Nùng anh ao (? -1039) controlled Vu Lc Prefecture, his family's traditional seat of power.
38
 Nùng Tôn Phúc's 
local prominence was bolstered by both wealth and political influence. Quang Nguyên Prefecture reportedly 
was a great source of gold, and that this natural wealth had made Nùng Tôn Phúc a rich man.
39
 
 
Moreover, Tôn Phúc augmented his existing riches through local trade.
40
 His citadel's location on the banks of 
the Bng River suggests that he had managed to capitalize on a placement of his power base along the region's 
main trading artery. The control of river traffic was likely Tôn Phúc's method for extracting the greatest material 
benefit from his political command.
41
 Equally important was the fact that Tôn Phúc's Nung clan had gained a 
reputation in both courts of being a loyal and trusted vassal in a region that had seen considerable turmoil for 
over one hundred years. At the time of his rebellion he was the region's most powerful man. However, political 
authority coupled with military might, and not the accumulation of material wealth, was the measure for 
individual success in Tôn Phúc's day. 
 
Nùng Tôn Phuc's "home region" along the Bang River consisted of nine semi-autonomous regions of various 
sizes, called po or bu.
42
 Historians of uplands Tai-speaking societies on the pre-modern Southeast Asian 
Mainland refer to these communities as muang.
43
 However, as the anthropologist Ann Maxwell Hill notes, 
muang is not easily translated in English as "kingdom" or "state," because these terms suggest a unity that 
muang traditionally lacked."
44
 The historian David Wyatt notes that the term "denotes as much personal as 
spatial relationships."
45
 Muang would grow and contract through as the result of forced capture, marriage 
alliances and the cooperation of leaders from a single clan. As Hill writes, "such alliances created loose, shifting 
hierarchies of muang in which one domain and princely family would be recognized by the others as the 
political center."
46
 However, under such circumstances, control from the center of a muang would depend 
heavily on the consensus of the leader's most powerful followers. 
 
Regarding Nùng leadership's relations with both the Vietnamese and Chinese courts, one must consider that 
frontier chieftains likely accepted a flexible understanding of regional sovereignty and overlapping spheres of 
authority in the region. This system may not have adhered closely to the tributary model that the Song court 
believed provided a political framework for this part of the empire. The notion of sovereignty most familiar to 
Western readers is one that describes supreme and independent political authority. However, this definition does 
not fully describe the patterns of relations that existed between the pre-modern mainland Southeast Asian 
societies on China's southwestern frontier. A more accurate term might be "shared sovereignty," through which 
a less powerful kingdom might establish tributary relations with two overlords, without undermining the 
regional authority of either of these larger kingdoms.
47
 Thongchai Winichakul writes that the sovereignty of 
premodern Southeast Asian states were "multiple and capable of being shared- one for its own ruler, another for 
its overlord- not in terms of a divided sovereignty but rather a sovereignty of hierarchical layers."
48
 Such a 
model of relations could be applied to the kind of ties maintained by the Nùng and other frontier communities 
with the ai Cô Viêt court at Thng Long. However, this model doesn't appear to extend north of the frontier 
region. When Nùng Tr' Cao and his mother would later lead a revolt to establish the Great Succession 
Kingdom, Vietnamese records told how Tr' Cao was captured, pardoned by the emperor, and eventually placed 
in charge of Quang Nguyên Prefecture.
49
 There was no mention of the Song presence in the region, nor was 
there any suggestion that the Chinese had any influence over this appointment.  
 
Another important feature of political relations among the communities among the southwestern frontier was a 
nascent client-patron system of social intercourse. As Thongchai Winichakul writes, "in the indigenous 
Southeast Asian tradition, a subject was bound first and foremost to his lord rather than to a state."
50
 This 
system has been described in the context of the early Thai kings, but it has applications to relations between 
leading Tai-speaking clans in the Left and Right Rivers Region and the Song and ai Cô Viet courts. This patron-
client system involved the presentation of gifts as the central feature of a request for protection and patronage.
51
 
David Wyatt writes, "Although muang society was hierarchical, it must be emphasized that the patron-client 
relationship, the ruler/ruled dichotomy, was not nearly as one-sided as it may appear."
52
 As another Thai 
historian notes, "when a 'Phu Noi (the Inferior)' gave gifts (to) or performed services (for) a 'Phu Yai (the 
Superior)' and the (latter) gave favor, protection or assistance to him in return, then the 'Phu Noi' kept on doing 
so. (However), if the 'Phu Yai' didn't do anything in return, the Thu Noi' could stop giving... services."
53
 This 
system of reciprocity differed from the Chinese system of tribute relations in that it was based on actions taken 
by each party, and not relationship that existed between them. Song Taizu, by accepting the tribute of the Nùng 
leader Nùng Dân Phú, saw the established relationship as hereditary and unconditional. This relationship was 
regulated with each presentation of tribute to the Chinese court; however, its position within the overall 
tributary hierarchy was left unchanged. From the Nùng leadership's perspective, however, the presentation of 
tribute set up obligations for both parties. When the Nùng found themselves squeezed by an expanding Viêt 
dominion to its south, and without the direct support of their Song "patron" to the north, they felt no obligation 
to temper their own bids for power. 
 
Here we also see the possibility for multiple "Tai” meanings in the Chinese character political titles that Nùng 
Tôn Phúc adopted. Contained within Tôn Phúc's own chosen imperial title was the character zhao. Zhao was a 
term in common usage among the Tai-speaking peoples of South and Central Mainland Southeast Asia to 
denote "chief," -king," or "prince" in the local political order.
54
 The term is written as chao in the transliteration 
of modern Thai. This title was referred to the territory claimed by the local ruler, as well as the populations 
under his control. There are a number of variants in the Chinese historical record for this title zhao, including 
zhao, zhao and zhao incorporated into the name of the Nanzhao kingdom. Moreover the character for 
"king/prince" and "august one/emperor" are homophones (huông) in the modem Tai "Nùng" dialect spoken in 
Tôn Phúc's home region. 
 
Leaders of muang were referred to in Tai-speaking communities as caw (alternate transliterations include the 
Thai chao and the Shan term sao), and they were lords of varying degrees of power who received tribute and 
corvee labor from villages that sought the regional stability these military strongmen promised to provide.
55
 
Moreover, when a muang (or po) lost its leader, the other regions would gather together in a "competition," 
from which a new strongman displaying leadership qualities would emerge.
56
 While this position could be 
considered hereditary, the leading family had to maintain their stature as powerful and effective leaders, or they 
would face further challenges from their neighbors. One scholar studying the southwest border Chieftaincy 
system in place during the later Ming period has compared the network of relations between these regions to the 
feudal system of the Warring States period after examining the autonomous nature of the smaller political units 
and the harsh manner in which larger chiefdoms preyed on their smaller neighbors.
57
 This competition between 
chiefdoms was recorded as early as the Tang dynasty, when the Wei, Huang, Zhou, and Nùng clans would often 
invade each other's territory. Even before the Song period, when Ming leaders perceived that the opportunity for 
affirming their local preeminence had arrived, they acted in a manner consistent with the prevailing system of 
indicators of political power. The Chinese system of titles and appointments wielded authority beyond the 
immediate region in which the Nùng lived, but the clan required local symbols of power to protect themselves 
at home. 
One should also note that Nùng Tôn Phúc's actions were not without historical precedent. There were the 
examples of past kingdoms that had sprung up in South China during two major periods of dynastic disunion, 
the period of Northern and Southern Courts (222-589) and the Five Dynasties Period (907-979). Perhaps more 
importantly, there was the example of the southwestern Tai-speaking Nanzhao Kingdom (mid- 7th cent. -1253), 
founded by a local chieftain in the 7th century. The Nanzhao kingdom had managed to repel initial attacks by 
the Tang court, and it thrived in its position along the southwestern frontier of the Tang Empire. The kingdom 
continued to maintain its tributary status as the Dali kingdom in the Nùng leader's own day. 
 
The successes of Nanzhao and Dali could certainly have encouraged Ton Phúc to assert his claim to local 
independence with the possibility that his frontier kingdom would be allowed to survive. George Condominas 
argued, not without controversy, that the robust survival of the Nanzhao kingdom contributed directly to the 
spread of Tai political culture in the region "to constitute a vast area of Thai principalities, extending from the 
southern confines of Nan-chao and covering the northern area of continental Southeast Asia in its wider sense 
from Hainan and Upper Tonkin to Assam' (p.40).
58
 Tributary issues should not overshadow our consideration of 
this possible "Tai" path to power when we explore the reasons for this seemingly sudden outburst of violence 
along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier. 
 
Conclusion: 
Given his flouting of tributary obligations enforced by the Vietnamese and the Chinese along their common 
frontier, Tôn Phúc's attempt to establish an independent kingdom between the Song Empire and the ai Cô Viêt 
kingdom was almost doomed to failure. However, his efforts set the stage for the subsequent rebellions of his 
son Nung Tri Cao and wife A Nung, which would sweep across the South China coast to the horror of both 
Kaifeng and Thng Long. Moreover, Tôn Phúc's revolt marked the strongest expression to date of local political 
ambition that would be clearly understood by the Han Chinese and Kinh Vietnamese residents in this region. 
 
In 1041, two years after his father and uncle's execution by ai Cô Viêt troops, Nùng Tr' Cao and his mother led 
forces to regain Thng Do Prefecture. Thus began a series of attempts by Tr' Cao and his mother to carve out 
another semi-autonomous polity in the frontier region. Nung Tôn Phuc's effort could be understood as an 
attempt by a local chieftain to mix local and imperial political symbols to express his desire to increase his local 
power base. Moreover, the territory claimed by Tôn Phuc remained fairly limited. Despite the grandness of the 
titles he took, Tôn Phuc was primarily addressing his own followers as, in the words of O.W. Wolters, a "man 
of prowess." Had the Vietnamese ruler Ly Phât Mã allowed Tôn Phuc to retain the modest gains he had made in 
territory and power, while reviving the personal bonds between the Vietnamese ruler and his frontier vassal, 
further widespread upheaval may have been avoided. 
 
Tôn Phuc's son Tri Cao, on the other hand, would lay claim to more territory and greater political stature. When 
the Song court left the response to Tri Cao's rebellion to their tributary vassal the Vietnamese court, the 
outcome was too limited and too tentative. From studying the different dimensions of the short-lived rebellion 
of Nung Ten Phuc, we might determine that the inability of both the Chinese and Vietnamese leadership to face 
Nung Tri Cao's revolt effectively in its early years began with their misunderstanding of his father's motives. 
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